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I. INTRODUCTION
In the years following its independence from former SFR Yugo-
slavia in 1991,1 the Republic of Macedonia experienced a process
of major societal change and reform. During what Dr. Huntington
denoted as the "third wave of democratization" that spread all
* Associate Professor and Vice Dean for International Cooperation, The Law School
of Saints Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia.
1. The Republic of Macedonia became an independent state amid the process of disso-
lution of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY") by the end of
1991, following a positive vote on a referendum for independence on September 8, 1991,
and the adoption of the Constitution on November 17, 1991. See Results on the Referendum
in the Republic of Macedonia of 8 September 1991, SLUZBEN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA
MAKEDONIJA [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA], nos. 43/91, 52/91.
Initially, four of the six ex-Yugoslav republics became independent after the demise of the
former SFRY: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia. See Opinions 1-10 of the Arbitration Commission established by the E.C. Peace
Conference on Yugoslavia, 92 INT'L L. REV. 162, 162-99. With the adoption of the Constitu-
tional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro of 2003, the latter state reconstituted itself as
"Serbia and Montenegro." SLUZBENI LIST SRBIJE I CRNE GORE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO], no. 1/03. On June 3, 2006, one of its constituent states-the
Republic of Montenegro-declared its independence and adopted its new Constitution on
October 19, 2007. See BBC News Europe - Montenegro Declares Independence,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5043462.stm (last visited March 30, 2009). See also SLUZBENI
LIST CRNE GORE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF MONTENEGRO], no. 1/07.
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over Eastern and Central Europe, 2 Macedonia underwent a pain-
ful transition from a socialist to a democratic system within a
complex social environment that produced unusual patterns of
political and institutional practices. Its multi-ethnic composition 3
further imposed the overriding necessity of maintaining the coun-
try's internal stability, which heavily depended on specific political
and institutional arrangements between its two largest ethnic
communities: ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. The lat-
ter have been assisted by the strong international presence in the
country. That, in view of Macedonia's aspiration to join the Euro-
pean Union ("EU") and the North Atlantic Treat Organization
("NATO") (under which Macedonia's current status is as a "candi-
date-for-membership" state) also resulted in the EU's active role
in imposing strict requirements on the character and pace of in-
ternal processes and reforms. 4
All of the above factors-the transition, the multi-ethnic compo-
sition of the country and its strive to join the Euro-Atlantic insti-
tutions-have had a large impact on the political, legal, and other
developments in Macedonia over the past decade and a half. In
this article, we will examine the way these factors have influenced
the functioning of the new Macedonian democratic system of gov-
ernance, particularly with respect to the operation of the principle
of separation of powers in practice. In doing that, we start from
the premise that, despite the proper wording in the constitutional
provisions, the practical effectiveness of the separation-of-powers
principle has been seriously jeopardized by the autocratic tenden-
cies practiced by the Macedonian political elite produced through-
out the transition process in the country and its struggle for inter-
nal stability. The EU's institutions should pay particular atten-
2. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE-DEMOCRATISATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY, (Univ. Okla. Press 1991).
3. According to the latest census of 2002, Macedonia has a population of 2,022,547
inhabitants of different ethnic origins, including: ethnic Macedonians (1,297,981), ethnic
Albanians (509,083), ethnic Turks (77,959), ethnic Rhomas (53,879), ethnic Serbs (35,939),
ethnic Bosniacs (17,018), ethnic Vlachs (9,695), and other smaller etnicities (20,993). Cen-
sus of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002, State
Statistical Office of RM, Skopje (May 2005), available at
http://www.stat.gov.mklpdf/kniga-13.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
4. On the EU Policy of Enlargement and the role played by its institutions in the
enlargement process. See European Commission - The Enlargement Policy,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/index-en.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). Macedonia
was granted "candidate state" status for membership in the EU in December 2005 and is
currently waiting to begin formal accession negotiations with the EU's institutions. Id.
Other candidate-states for membership include Croatia and Turkey, both of which have
already begun accession negotiations. Id.
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tion to this problem and provide active guidance to the country's
preparation for joining the EU.
II. THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
IN LIGHT OF ITS DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
At the beginning of the post-independence process of democratic
transition, Macedonia's new system of governance was formally
put in place rather quickly, with the adoption of the Democratic
Constitution of 1991. 5 In the Constitution, the principle of "sepa-
ration of powers" has been solemnly promoted into a fundamental
value of the constitutional order of Macedonia, 6 and new (or re-
shaped) democratic institutions were put in place. According to
that principle, however, effective operation of the reformed system
could not have been achieved merely through legislation. The
practical functioning of the constitutionally-inaugurated model of
governance largely depended on the behavior of the country's ma-
jor political factors, including the political parties and especially
their party leaders. In Macedonia, as in other Southeastern
European countries, the transition process created a distorted
model of practicing democracy by the local political elite, which
some scholars are apt to describe as partitocrazia-an Italian
word borrowed to denote the strong tendency of the leaders of the
affiliated political and business oligarchy sitting atop centralized
political parties to dictate the functioning state institutions and
overall social and political life.
7
A. The System of Governance According to the Constitution
The political system of the Republic of Macedonia is best de-
scribed as a mixed model of governance-parliamentary with
some elements of a semi-presidential system, though some schol-
ars tend to emphasize the predominance of its parliamentarian
5. Ustav na Republika Makedonija, SLUZBEN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA], no. 52/91. The Constitution was
later amended on several occasions. See SLUZBEN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA], nos. 1/92, 31/98, 91/01, 84/03, 107/05.
Major amendments took place in 2001, as result of the Ohrid Agreement that ended the
military crises of that year. See infra notes 56 and 57.
6. CONSTITUTION art. 8 (Maced.).
7. See Gordana Siljanovska Davkova, Organizational Structures and Internal Party
Democracy in the Republic of Macedonia, in ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND INTERNAL
PARTY DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE 29 (Georgi Karasimenov et al. eds., 2005).
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aspects.8 The Macedonian Parliament (the "Assembly") is defined
by the Constitution as the "citizens' representative body" vested
with legislative powers. 9 The executive branch, in turn, is two-
headed, with the Government holding effective executive powers,
and the President of the Republic-though directly elected-
exercising merely symbolic and shared functions with the Gov-
ernment in foreign affairs, security, and defense. 10 Judicial power
rests with the courts, which are bound to exercise the judicial
function as autonomous and independent bodies in accordance
with the Constitution, legislation in force, and ratified interna-
tional treaties.1'
The strong parliamentarian aspects of the Macedonian system
of governance are highlighted by the powers of Parliament vis-a-
vis the executive branch. The Parliament approves the Govern-
ment, supervises its work, and may vote for non-confidence or ex-
ercise the right of interpellation of individual members of the Gov-
ernment or of other holders of public functions, 12 apart from its
ordinary exercise of control over the Government through MPs'
questions. With respect to the President of the Republic, Parlia-
ment may ask for his opinion on issues within his competence and
may institute impeachment of the President if he violates the
Constitution or positive laws or in the case of his alleged physical
incapability of performing the presidential function. 13
Neither the Government nor the President can dissolve Parlia-
ment.14 The latter can dissolve only through a vote in Parliament
8. Igor Spirovski, Separation of Powers between the Political Branches of Government
in the Republic of Macedonia, 219, 226-27 (2001), available at
http://www.ejournal.unam.mx/cuc/cconst05/CUC00507.pdf; Svetomir Skaric, Ustavno
pravo, vtora kniga, UNION TRADE 390 (Skopje 1995); Gordana Siljanovska Dakova, Za
Makedonskiot Model na Organizacija na Viasta, in ZBORNIK VO CEST NA PROF. VLADIMIR
MITKOV, PRAVEN FAKULTET 'JUSTINIAN PRVI' 7 (Skopje).
9. CONSTITUTION art. 61 (Maced.).
10. See Spirovski, supra note 8, at 223-34. The same author concludes that, within the
two-headed Execuive, "the Government, and not the President is the bearer (the real head)
of the executive power." Id. at 224. Shared competences between the President and the
Government inter alias include the area of Defense, where the President of the Republic
acts as "Commander in Chief of the Armed forces of Macedonia" and presides with the
Defense Council of the Republic of Macedonia. CONSTITUTION arts. 79, 86 (Maced.). Also in
foreign affairs, the President "represents the Republic" and appoints and revokes ambassa-
dors and other diplomatic representatives abroad, under proposal by the Government.
CONSTITUTION arts. 79, 84, 91 (Maced.).
11. CONSTITUTION art. 98 (Maced.).
12. CONSTITUTION arts. 68, 72 (Maced.).
13. CONSTITUTION arts. 85, 87 (Maced.).
14. Dakova, supra note 8, at 9.
924 Vol. 47
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itsellf"5 -a solution that "adds to the Macedonian parliamentarian-
presidential system hybrid an element of an Assembly system."'
16
The centrality of Parliament in the Macedonian system of gov-
ernance is also visible by its power over the Judiciary. Apart from
enacting the necessary legislation related to the organization of
courts, it also determines the court's budget and nominates 3 of
the 15 members of the Judicial Council, 17 a body charged with ap-
pointment of and control over judges.' 8 Parliament's influence on
the judiciary was much stronger before the latest reforms of the
judiciary of 2006, as it had been directly electing the judges under
proposal by the Council. 19 In addition, Parliament elects the 9
members of the Constitutional Court, 3 of which must be elected
by a special majority vote. 20 The Parliament also elects the Public
15. CONSTITUTION art. 63 (Maced.).
16. Dakova, supra note 8, at 9.
17. The composition of the Judicial Council is mixed: out of its 15 members, the Presi-
dent of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Macedonia and the Minister for Justice are
members ex officio, and eight other members are elected by the judges from among their
own ranks. CONSTITUTION amend. 28(3) (2005) (Maced.). (Three of those members, how-
ever, must belong to the ethnic "communities which represent a minority in the country."
Id.) The remaining five members of the Judicial Council are nominated by Parliament
(three members) and "proposed" by the President of the Republic (two members, one of
which must belong to a minority ethnic community), from among university law professors,
practicing lawyers, or other legal experts. CONSTITUTION amend. 28(5) (2005) (Maced.).
The mandate of the members of the Judicial Council is six years, with a right to be re-
elected for another term. CONSTITUTION amend. 28(6) (2005) (Maced.).
18. CONSTITUTION amend. 29 (2005) (Maced.). The Judicial Council, inter alia, elects
and revokes the judges and jurors, surveys and evaluates the work of judges, decides on
disciplinary responsibility of judges, and on waiver of their immunity, etc. Id.
19. CONSTITUTION art. 68(1), amended by CONSTITUTION amend. 19 (2005) (Maced.).
The election of judges by Parliament (under proposal by the then-existent Republican Judi-
cial Council) in the past opened the possibility for strong influence by the ruling political
parties holding majority seats in Parliament over the composition of courts. On the factual
influence of the ruling party(ies) / their political leadership over decision-making in Par-
liament in general, see Davkova, supra note 8, at 13-15; see also Davkova, supra note 7, at
49-50. The consequences of such past practice with respect to the courts' composition are
still strongly felt. The reforms of the judiciary of 2006 inter alias resulted in the new Law
on Courts. SLUZBEN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA], nos. 58/06, 35/08.
20. The so-called "Badinter majority" in Parliament, which, in order to be adopted,
apart from a majority vote of all MPs present in Parliament, a decision must also acquire a
vote by the majority of MPs belonging to the ethnic "communities representing a minority
in the country." See infra note 59. Two of the nine judges of the Constitutional Court are
elected under a proposal of the President of the Republic. CONSTITUTION art. 84 (Maced.).
Competences of the Constitutional Court include deciding on: constitutionality and legality
of laws and regulations; conflicts between bearers of the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government; competences between central and local self-government bodies;
protecting (certain enumerated) human rights and freedoms; accountability and termina-
tion of the office of the President of the Republic; etc. CONSTITUTION art. 110 (Maced.).
With respect of the first of these competences that predominate the Constitutional Court's
926 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 47
Prosecutor of the Republic, with the other public prosecutors being
elected by a special body- the Public Prosecutors Council. 21
The Government is formed by the party (or coalition of parties)
that won the majority of seats in Parliament. 22 It is the main ex-
ecutive body with an almost-exclusive power to initiate new legis-
lation, including the state budget.23 Over 97% of Macedonian leg-
islation is adopted under the Government's proposal, whereas the
rest of the legislation is enacted under proposals by other compe-
tent initiators that require prior the Government's opinion.24
Some elements of a semi-presidential model of governance in
the Macedonian political system can be discerned from the powers
of the President of the Republic.25 Apart from being directly
elected, the President exercises the right of a "suspensive veto"
over legislation enacted in Parliament; however, that power only
extends towards statutes adopted in Parliament by a simple ma-
jority vote. 26 The effect of the President's veto over such legisla-
tion would thus be to bring back the respective piece of legislation
in Parliament, which could then proceed towards its adoption by a
qualified majority vote.27 The legislation adopted by qualified ma-
work, there is an actio popularis, so that everyone is entitled to initiate proceedings and
appear before the Court. See Spirovski, supra note 8, at 232-33.
21. CONSTITUTION amend. 30 (2005) (Maced.).
22. CONSTITUTION art. 90 (Maced.).
23. CONSTITUTION art. 91 (Maced.). See Dakova, supra note 8, at 8.
24. Davkova, supra note 8, at 8. New legislation could also be initiated by any MP and
by a group of 10,000 citizens. CONSTITUTION art. 71 (Maced.).
25. Dakova, supra note 8, at 8. Given the constitutional powers of the President of the
Republic, some authors even claim the "semi-presidential" or "parliamentary-presidential"
character of the Macedonian political system. See Svetomir Skaric, Ustavno pravo, UNION
TRADE 395 (Skopje, 2d ed., 1995). However, Igor Spirovski, while admitting that the latter
could not be classified either into a presidential or a parliamentary system, still maintains
that, the political system of Macedonia, as the other systems of the new democracies in
Europe, despite the mixture of different elements in them are "all the more designed to
work as parliamentary systems. The existence of various solutions that imply reception of
elements of presidential system could not challenge the basic principle." Spirovski, supra
note 8, at 226-27.
26. CONSTITUTION art. 75 (Maced.), which reads:
Laws are proclaimed by a decree.
The decree on the proclamation of laws is signed by the President of the Republic and
the President of Parliament.
The President of the Republic may decide not to sign the law. The Parliament reads
again the law and if it adopts it by a majority votes of the total number of members of
Parliament, the President is bound to sign it.
The President is bound to sign the decree if, according to the Constitution, the law is
to be adopted by a two-third majority votes of the total number of members of Par-
liament.
Id.
27. CONSTITUTION art. 75(3) (Maced.).
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jority would stand outside the President's veto power. 28 When
compared to the French semi-presidential system, the role of the
President is weaker, as he does not appoint the President of the
Government and the government ministers and does not preside
with Government sessions or sign the Government's acts.29 In
addition, the President of the Republic does not initiate legisla-
tion. 30 As mentioned above, he is also not empowered to dissolve
Parliament, as the latter can only dissolve by itself.31 On the
other hand, the President exercises special prerogatives in times
of a state of "war" or "emergency," including the right to appoint or
dismiss the Government or its ministers (in case Parliament could
not be assembled); however, the President lacks the power to issue
decrees with legislative force.
32
Despite the President's much weaker position as compared to
that of the Government, the two-headed executive requires close
cooperation between the two offices-in particular, in the areas
where both exercise shared authority.33 Effective cooperation,
however, proved very difficult (often impossible) to achieve in
times of co-habitation between the two branches, especially when
the Government (the Prime Minister) belongs to the ruling
party(ies) and the President of the Republic-to the party(ies) in
opposition. 34 The latter has much to do with the centralized or-
ganization of the major political parties in Macedonia, which are
largely personified by their leaders, who almost persistently main-
tain tense interaction with each other-sometimes extending to
the level of mutual intolerance and disrespect.
B. How Does the System Work?
The Constitution only establishes the formal setting of the sys-
tem of governance in Macedonia, whereas reality shows some
rather disturbing effects. Writing about the functioning of the
Macedonian system of governance-in particular with respect to
28. CONSTITUTION art. 75(4) (Maced.).
29. Spirovski, supra note 8, at 226.
30. As mentioned above, new legislation could be initiated only by the Government,
individual MPs and/or 10,000 citizens. See supra note 25.
31. See supra notes 14-15.
32. CONSTITUTION art. 127 (Maced.). Decrees with legislative force could only be issued
by the Government. CONSTITUTION art. 126 (Maced.). The state of war or an emergency
situation could be proclaimed by Parliament or, in case the latter could not be assembled,
by the President of the Republic. CONSTITUTION arts. 124, 125 (Maced.).
33. See supra note 10.
34. See infra notes 47, 48.
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the role of the political parties-one prominent Macedonian con-
stitutional lawyer points to the autocratic and elitist elements
within the parties that tend to control the overall political process
and all social life:
Macedonia functions like a "party state", not as a "Recht-
staat". The high public officials selected by [the] "spoils sys-
tem" work as "party officials", not as state officials, who
should work for the benefit of the citizens[.] . . . "Parti-
tocrazia" penetrates all areas of the state and the ruling par-
ties colonize society and numerous sectors of the state. Clien-
telism (the use of state resources of various kinds in the inter-
est of those in power) has grown rapidly.... Partitocrazia and
clientelism provide one of the basis [sic] for corruption and fa-
cilitates its spread[.]
35
The above description of the political governance in Macedonia
is based on the heavily centralized internal structure of the politi-
cal parties, placed under personal control of their party leaders
and of a close group of party leadership loyal to their leader. The
leader and its "party camarillas '' 36 tend to control and direct the
internal activity of the respective political party quite often in
their own self-interests or at least according to their individual
autocratic belief. In large part, the closed-party leadership derives
from old ex-socialist structures of managers and the new business
elite created throughout "dubious" privatizations of formerly state-
owned companies. 37 Whatever their background, 38 the closed-
35. Davkova, supra note 7, at 50. See GORDANA SILJANOvsKA DAVKOVA, Makedonske
Politicke Partije Kroz Prizmu Ideologije, in POLITICKE STRANKE I BIRACI U DRZAVI BIVSE
JUGOSLAVIJE 205-06 (Zoran Lutovac et al. eds.) (2006).
36. Davkova, supra note 7, at 30.
37. Referring to the "initital accumalation of capital" through privatization of state-
owned companies during the nineties, mainly performed by the Social-Democratic Alliance
of Macedonia (SDSM-a political party derived from the ex-communist party in ex-SFRY),
Davkova comments: "[i]f 'sheep had eaten men' in England at the beginning of the XIX
century, then, in Macedonia, that has been done by the old-new managers, members or
sympathizers of the ruling parties .... " Davkova, supra note 7, at 214, 221. On another
place, the same author describes the "old-new" managerial and business (oligarchic) struc-
tures affiliated with the political parties as "business politicians" who "have no ideological
or programmatic conviction and who have built their careers through clientelism." Davk-
ova, supra note 7, at 45-46.
38. Unlike some other Central and Eastern European countries, Macedonia did not
proceed with the so-called lustration of collaborators with former socialist security and
related structures in the first transition years. Such a process was initiated in January
2008, with the adoption of the Law on the determination of additional condition on the
exercise of a public function. Zakon za opredeluvawe dopolnitelen uslov za vrsenje na javna
funkcija, SLUZBEN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE
928 Vol. 47
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party elites impose their self-interest over the respective political
party with pure pragmatism playing the most important role.
Party ideology and active membership participation in policy-
making within political parties appears to be much less impor-
tant-if important at all.
3 9
Because a closed group of party leaders holds major posts within
the political system, a tendency toward autocratic control quite
naturally spreads over the functioning of state institutions, to the
point where "it is difficult to tell where the state ends and the par-
ties begin (like Italian partitocrazia).'"40 The extent of party con-
trol reflects on the functioning of all institutions in the system of
governance, including the Government, Parliament, and other key
institutions. The Government is under direct control of the ruling
party's elite as the party leader of the ruling party often acts as
Prime Minister and his "comrades" hold key ministerial posts.
41
Party leadership thus becomes the key decision-making body
while Parliament loses its deliberative role. The MPs of the ruling
party (or parties) comprising Parliament's majority merely legiti-
mize decisions already adopted by the Government through a well-
disciplined voting machine. 42 MPs regularly demonstrate strict
loyalty to their party leadership, which is largely due to the pro-
portional electoral system and centralized decision-making over
the composition of electoral party lists. 43 The Government, con-
trolled by the ruling party's elite, is secured from being account-
able to Parliament and through influencing its decisions, includ-
ing the appointment of the members of the Judicial Council, the
court budget, and the election of the Public Prosecutor of the Re-
public. Thus, the empowered elite is also able to control the judi-
cial branch of government. 44 Additionally, the political parties
exercise a very strong influence over the public media and a large
part of civil society in Macedonia.
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA], no. 14/08. Until that time, former collaborators with the secu-
rity structures of ex-Yugoslavia were free to enter public functions without any condition
imposed. The new Law on Lustration conditions the exercise by a candidate a public func-
tion (elective or state and public service or any other public activity or public mandate)
with his prior written declaration of non-collaboration with state security agencies and
with verification of his non-collaboration by a special verification Commission and by
Courts. See id. at arts. 1, 2.
39. See Davkova, supra note 7, at 41.
40. Id. at 28-29.
41. Id. at 46-47.
42. See id. See also Dakova, supra note 8, at 13-15.
43. Davkova, supra note 7, at 49-50
44. On Parliament's prerogatives in the appointment of judges and the Public Prosecu-
tor, see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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Strong predominance of party leadership is also present with
respect to the role of the President of the Republic (when the
President belongs to the ruling party). However, some tensions
existed between the Prime Minister and the President of the same
party during the presidency of the late Mr. Trajkovski.45 Frictions
between the Prime Minister and the President at that time were
due to the two leaders' conceptual differences over the solution of
the 2001 military crisis in the country and over the post-crisis re-
forms. When the Prime Minister and the President belong to dif-
ferent political parties, difficult questions of co-habitation still
arise. Mutual tendencies of establishing prevailing authority over
the other, usually inspired by close party interests and even per-
sonal intolerance between the two officeholders, make their co-
habitation uneasy and sometimes impossible, to the point of block-
ing normal decision-making in areas of shared competence, includ-
ing foreign affairs, security, and defense. In fact, we have recently
witnessed heavy frictions with the current co-habitation between
Prime Minister Gruevski and President Crvenkovski, reflected,
among others, on the current issue of the highest national impor-
tance-the negotiations on the "difference" over the name of the
country with Greece, mediated within the UN.46
45. See Spirovski, supra note 8, at 228-31 (commenting on the role of the President of
the Republic and complex co-habitation problems arising in the practical functioning of the
Macedonian system of governance).
46. Negotiations between Macedonia and Greece on the "difference over the name" of
the country have been ongoing within the United Nations since the adoption of Security
Council Resolution 817 in 1993 and are currently mediated by Mr. Matew Niemitz, a spe-
cial envoy of the Secretary General of the UN. Strong disagreements between the current
President (Mr. Crvenkovski, belonging to the opposition party-SDSM) and the Prime
Minister (Mr. Gruevski, belonging to the ruling VMRO) were highlighted following the last
NATO summit in Bucharest where Macedonia had not been extended the expected invita-
tion for membership because of strong opposition by Greece. See Press Release, NATO
Summit of Heads of State and Government, April 3, 2008 (on file with author). As the
negotiations on the "difference over the name" of the country were intensified after that
Summit, the President and the Prime Minister could not agree on the strategy or the plat-
form for negotiation or even on the negotiator representing the Macedonian side. See, e.g.,
Branko Crvenkovski, Address at the Macedonian Assembly, (Nov. 3, 2008) (transcript
available at http://www.pretsedatel.mk/prilozi/dokumenti/, at 6-8). In his address, the President
inter alia, "agreeing completely" with the recent public criticisms about the damages in-
flicted on the state interest by the different positions on the negotiations between himself
and the Prime Minister, elaborates on the conceptual differences between the two. Id. at 6-
8. See also Na posledniot predlog na Nimic sme odgovorile so dvojna formula, UTRINSKI
VESNIK, Nov. 6, 2008, at no. 2830 (Maced.), available at http://www.utrinski.com.mk/.
Other areas of strong disagreement between the two offices included the appointment of
Macedonian ambassadors in other countries, where both the President and the Prime Min-
ister have shared authority. See, e.g., Nova ambasadorska kriza, VECER (Maced.), April 7,
2008, at no. 13,843, available at http://www.vecer.com.mk (refusal by the President of the
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The root causes of strong authoritarian tendencies within the
political parties that are reflected on the whole political system
are various and include, inter alia, the lack of a democratic culture
among political actors, due to inherited ex-socialist habits, their
patriarchal political culture, and an archaic, or rather, primitive
understanding of the political process.47 Macedonian political cul-
ture is not rooted in liberal democratic values. Whatever the
causes, the strong statement of the above-cited commentator
about the controlling role played by the closed party leadership
personalized in their party leaders within and outside political
parties still strongly holds. To use her words again:
We failed to create a political system based on stable institu-
tions. Instead, it relies to party leaders, who then behave like
political gods. Macedonian party leaders are synonymous
with an authoritarian mentality in the political leadership.
They put themselves above the party, party organs and party
members, thus becoming serious obstacle to the democracy
and progress of their parties and the country as a whole. 48
One important consequence of the authoritarian role exercised
by party leaders and their close party allies is that the political
decision-making in Macedonia largely depends on their will. More
importantly, the overall political stability in the country also de-
pends on their will. This stability has great relevance when we
add in the ever-present inter-ethnic dimension in the practical
functioning of the Macedonian system of governance, crucial for
maintaining the political stability necessary for Macedonia's ac-
cession to the EU.
III. THE INTER-ETHNIC DIMENSION OF THE MACEDONIAN SYSTEM
Macedonia is mix of a number of different ethnicities, with two
ethnic communities dominating in the country: ethnic Macedoni-
ans, comprising of about 65% of the total population, and ethnic
Albanians, comprising of around 25% of the Macedonian popula-
tion.49 Since Macedonia achieved its independence, a peculiar
model of power-sharing between the political parties of both ethnic
Republic to appoint Macedonia's ambassadors in India and Israel of July 2008, one in a
series of such episodes). See also Spirovski, supra note 8, at 228-231.
47. Dakova, supra note 7, at 29.
48. Id. at 46.
49. See supra note 3.
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communities has developed, reflecting on every segment of politi-
cal life. 50 The political elites of both ethnicities have constantly
maintained a strong tendency towards exercising shared influence
over the functioning of all branches of government, including the
judiciary. Inter-leadership arrangements direct the composition
and operation of state institutions according to leaders' personal
needs.
This is possible due to the heavily centralized internal organiza-
tion of the Albanian Parties, a syndrome that is quite evidently
widely spread among all Macedonian political parties. The Alba-
nian ethnic community is currently represented by two major par-
ties, the Democratic Party for Integration (DUD, derived from the
former Albanian National Liberation Army, active during the
military crises of 2001 (presently in the Government coalition with
the ruling Macedonian party-VMRO) and the Party for Democ-
ratic Prosperity (DPA).51 Though the sharp rivalry between the
Albanian parties is especially visible during elections, both parties
demonstrate particular loyalty to an "ethnic agenda"-the "Alba-
nian National Issue"-introducing a strong ethnic element within
Macedonian internal politics. 52 Every Macedonian Government is
composed of a coalition, which necessarily includes one of the Al-
banian parties. This practice is publicly viewed as crucial for
maintaining internal political and overall stability in the country.
However, given the rather primitive and authoritarian political
culture among the Macedonian political elites, these coalitions
often depend on close dealings between coalition party leaders on
issues often exceeding inter-ethnic relations. Party leaders often
arrange major public and administrative appointments, negotiate
access to public wealth, and even help close party members avoid
criminal charges. These dealings are made possible by the consid-
erable influence exercised by the Government on the police, public
prosecutors, and courts.
53
50. See Davkova, supra note 7, at 226. See also Biljana Vankovska, The Role of the
Ohrid Framework Agreement and the Peace Process in Macedonia, TRANSNATIONAL
FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND FUTURE RESEARCH, 2006,
http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/forum/meet/206/Vankovska-Macedonia-Check.pdf.
51. See Davkova, supra note 7, at 230-32 (discussing both political parties).
52. Id. at 30.
53. See Vankovska, supra note 50, at 15. The latest example of political influence exer-
cised by party leaders related to criminal prosecution of close party members is the case of
Mr. H. Dzemaili, one of the three MPs (all former Albanian NLA fighters) belonging to the
ruling coalition's Albanian party DUI, charged with the crime of torturing four civilians
during the military crises in Macedonia of 2001 (the so-called "Hague Cases"); after months
of inaction by the police regarding the arrest of Mr. Dzemaili in execution of a court's deten-
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The ethnically motivated military crises plaguing Macedonia in
the first half of 2001 exacerbated the pattern of political govern-
ance through inter-leadership arrangements.5 4 The political set-
tlement ending the crises-the "Ohrid Framework Agreement"-
introduced major changes in the constitutional system and added
new elements to the traditional way of practicing politics in Mace-
donia.55 Being themselves a result of a political deal between the
ethnically grounded local actors brokered by the United States
and the EU, these changes largely formalized the model of inter-
ethnic dealings and further strengthened the role of political lead-
ers in directing the functioning of state institutions. Formal
amendments to the Constitution of 1991 were also enacted, intro-
ducing con-social elements in the already "party-cized" Macedo-
nian Parliament through the introduction of the "Badinter" voting
formula.5 6 According to that formula, major legislation in key ar-
eas of significance to the ethnic communities (subject to inter-
party bargaining) could not be adopted without the positive vote of
tion order and pending decision of a Parliament Commission on his immunity as an MP, his
detention was lifted by the court under a political agreement between the two coalition
leaders. See Haskite slucai se selat vo sudot, DNEVNIK, Sep. 27, 2008, (Maced.), available at
http://dnevnik.com.mk (statement transmitted by the local daily news-paper Dnevnik, made
by a "high official of the Democratic Party for Integration (DUD, that 'the Government
partners, Prime-minister Gruevski and leader Ali Ahmeti agreed for the court (sic!) to find
solution and to revoke the detention orders for the MPs.). The case has been strongly
criticized by the opposition as arranged between the two coalition partners and is still ongo-
ing. See id. (statement by the representative of the main opposition party SDSM).
54. The military crises in Macedonia that threatened to erupt in to a large-scale civil
war between ethnic Macedonians and ethic Albanians took place from February 2001 to
August 2001, when it ended under strong pressure exercised by NATO, the United States,
and the EU. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP REPS. 109 (April 1, 2001), 113 (June 20, 2001), 20
(July 27, 2001), 21 (Aug. 15, 2001) (all available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1244&l=1). See also Vankovska, supra note
50.
55. Named by the city of Ohrid, the venue of the negotiations among the leaders of four
(two ethnic Macedonian and two ethnic Albanian) major political parties-mediated by two
facilitators from the United States and the EU, the "Ohrid Framework Agreement" intro-
duced various changes related to the position of national minorities in Macedonia, includ-
ing: the constitutional category of "ethnic communities" (replacing that of "national minori-
ties"), arrangements on the use of the languages of minority communities, their better
representation in state administration, special voting procedures in Parliament, etc. See
Vankovska, supra note 50, at 7-10. The political arrangements of the Ohrid Agreement
were later enacted in a set of Amendments to the Constitution of 2001. SLUZBEN VESNIK
NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA], no.
91/01.
56. See Davkova, supra note 7, at 224-29 (describing the amendments as "constitution-
alization of the mechanisms of the so-called consocial democracy" in the Macedonian sys-
tem by the Ohrid Agreement and the formal amendments to the Constitution"). See also
AREND LIJPHARD, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (Yale
Univ. Press) (1977).
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the majority of MPs belonging to parties representing minority
ethnic communities. 57 Direct talks between leaders representing
ethnically based political parties outside Parliament became the
preferred model of settlement of politically sensitive issues, cover-
ing all important legislative measures.58 The political decision-
making process itself began to appear "more like blackmail and
unprincipled trade-off than a consensual and meaningful process
of reaching agreements over the most important issues in the
country."
59
The above arrangement, of course, further devaluated the im-
portance of Parliament in the legislative process and jeopardized
the independent functioning of state institutions, including that of
public prosecutors and judges. 60 The constitutional formula for
"equitable representation of the communities" in state institutions
provided an additional "alibi for partization of the state admini-
stration with people whose only credentials are in their party be-
longing."61  Thus, in the words of a commentator, "even more
qualified and experienced Albanians are discriminated by their
own ethnic kin of opposite party affiliation."
62
57. CONSTITUTION amend. 20(2) (Maced.) ("For the laws directly related to culture, use
of languages, education, personal documents and use of symbols, the Assembly decides by a
majority vote of the members present at the session, including a majority vote of the mem-
bers present belonging to the communities which are not a majority in the Republic of
Macedonia. Disputes related to the application of this provision are to be settled by the
Committee for the Relations between Communities.") The voting formula provided by this
provision, also referred to as an "ethnic veto" is better known as the "Badinter formula,"
named after its author-the French professor Robert Badinter. See Davkova, supra note 7,
at 227. The "Committee for the Relations between the Communities" mentioned in that
provision is an advisory body composed of nineteen members, seven of which represent the
ethnic Macedonians, seven-the ethnic Albanians, and five-the other communities in
Macedonia. CONSTITUTION amend. 22 (Maced.).
58. Davkova, supra note 7, at 228. Dakova writes:
During the application of the amendment which spirit is consocial democracy, we are
witnessing: blockades - even -paralysis of the decision-making process in Parliament
due to the double majority required (in fact, the double veto); de-institutionalization
that is weakening of the legal and legitimate institutions, since the decision-making
process is being moved outside of Parliament and located with the representatives of
the [ethnic] segments, which, instead of stimulating the "rule of law", stimulates the
"rule of men;" ethno-partization of the judiciary and of public administration and re-
lativisation even suspension of competence (merits) in the recruitment process by
which services for the ethnos and the parties are created, but not for citizens; corrup-
tion and crime, going hand in hand with the 'spoils' system.
Id. (placement of and style of punctuation appears as such in original).
59. Vankovska, supra note 50, at 16.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 15.
62. Id.
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The key role of local political leaders in the Macedonian political
process has been frequently tolerated by international factors pre-
sent in the country, especially by the United States and the EU,
which exercise a special supervisory role as "facilitators" of the
Ohrid Agreement. 63 Referring to the way the international com-
munity has been handling the post-2001 crisis processes in the
country, however, a prominent Macedonian scholar-Dr. Biljana
Vankovska-strongly criticizes its approach, concluding:
In the context of the Macedonian case[,] one can talk about
the so-called "banality of the ethnic conflict[,]" or to para-
phrase Mary Kaldor[-]in its haste to fix the problem[,] the
international community fell in the trap of the local[-]conflict
parties and rushed to embrace the thesis of ancient ethnic ha-
tred between the ethnic groups and even impossibility for
them to live together. Thus, the simplest solution was to
"separate" the "hostile" ethnic groups, to impose political
power-sharing and territorial arrangements that would guar-
antee a sort of peace (based on ethnicitization of politics and
ghettoisation of the citizens of different ethnic backgrounds).
The simplest solution is not always the best solution, but it
fulfills the criteria of a quick fix, at least, on a short-run. [...]
As for long-term results, there is still a lot of uncertainty[,]
but one can already make a preliminary remark: the road to
hell is indeed paved with good intentions!64
63. See Edvard Moxon-Brown, Ulogata na Evropskata Unija vo post-konfliktnite
opstestva, in KONTINUIRANO OBRAZOVANIE ZA EVROPSKi PRASANJA: OSNOVANJE NA TRENING
CENTAR ZA EvRoPsKI PRASANJA 468, 475-80 (Skopje 2006) (discussing the role of the EU in
the post-conflict period in Macedonia). A very sharp criticism on the way the international
community has been handling the preventive and post-conflict activities in Macedonia and
on the Ohrid Agreement Process may be found in the text of Vankovska, supra note 50.
Referring to her text, Moxon-Brown reports that the Republic of Macedonia posseses "to a
certain extent, characteristics of a 'protectorate', which political system is to a large extent
grounded on bargaining between the two ethnic blocks partially gaining their legitimacy
from sources outside of the country." Moxon-Brown, supra note 63. Noting the resem-
blance between the Ohrid Agreement and the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland,
however, Moxon-Brown also points to another characteristic shared by the two Agreements,
notably, "the potential for strengthening the ethnic divide in circumstances related to the
legislative process. Whereas, in [Macedonia], the Albanian minority is protected towards
the Macedonian majority, the interests of the smaller ethnic communities are not protected
towards the Albanian minority, except in a case where their interest would accidently col-
lide." Id. at 476 (referring to S. Kelleher, Minority Veto Rights in Power-Sharing Systems:
Lessons from Macedonia, Northern Ireland and Belgium, ADALAH'S NEWSLETTER, May 13,
2005, at 4).
64. Vankovska, supra note 60, at 1-2.
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Direct talks between party leadership of different ethnicities
over important (but often artificially constructed) political issues
have been recognized as the most efficient way of preserving the
country's internal political stability, which seems to have become
a major focus of the international activity in Macedonia at the ex-
pense of the effective application of constitutional principles and
the rule of law.65 Regrettably, that also means that:
Democratic procedures and institutions in Macedonia have
become a collateral damage [sic] because the leading motto is
"better peace than democracy". [... ] Unfortunately, the inter-
national community has [also] switched the cups: it is so
pragmatic to be ready to deal with corrupted ethnic elites
rather than to take risk and give the citizens more political
power and space to express their dissatisfaction with the way
thing go in their country.
66
IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNAL STABILITY AND MACEDONIA'S
ACCESSION TO'THE EUROPEAN UNION
The Republic of Macedonia is a "state-candidate" for member-
ship in the European Union, expecting to be invited to begin ac-
cession negotiations with the EU in the near future.67 Recognition
as a candidate state brings strict requirements imposed by the
Union, inter alia, related to the proper functioning of its political
system, according to well-established European democratic stan-
dards. 68 Under the "Copenhagen criteria" for EU membership, a
candidate state's political progress plays an important-and con-
65. See id. at 15.
66. Id.
67. See supra note 4.
68. According to the standardized EU accession strategy, the process of preparation of
Macedonia for accession to the Union is performed in accordance with several instruments,
including the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and the Accession Partner-
ship (formerly European Partnership). See Malinka Ristevska-Jordanova, Partnerstva za
pristapuvanje/Evropski partnerstva - eden instrument dva brana, in KONTINUIRANO
OBRAZOVANIE ZA EVRoPSKI PRASANJA: OSNOVANJE NA TRENING CENTAR ZA EVROPSKI
PRASANJA 437 (Skopje 2006). The Accession Partnership includes various short- and mid-
term priorities that have to be satisfied by the candidate state (Macedonia) as benchmarks
for further progress and the financial means to support its efforts. The political part of this
membership criteria (the Copenhagen Criteria), relates to, inter alia, the reform of public
administration, the judiciary, the fight against corruption, human rights, and the protec-
tion of minorities, including the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. See id. at 444-49.
See also Council Decision 2008/121/EC, OFFICIAL JOURNAL L 080 (March 19, 2008) (repeal-
ing Council Decision 2006/52/EC). Financial support for Macedonia is provided through the
Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA), established under Council Regulation No. 1085/2006,
OFFICIAL JOURNAL L 210 (July 31, 2006), at 12.
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stantly measured-role in accession to the EU.69 Improving de-
mocratic standards under these criteria, however, often conflicts
with the overall requirement to maintain the country's internal
political stability, as this Article has demonstrated, largely de-
pends upon the political dealings among autocratic party leaders.
Among the EU's institutions, the European Commission is par-
ticularly active in monitoring a candidate state's efforts in adopt-
ing the required democratic standards. The Commission records
deficiencies in the functioning of the different branches of gov-
ernment in regular progress reports.70 The Commission fre-
quently also sets benchmarks that must be satisfied to proceed
further with the country's preparation for EU accession and re-
ceipt of additional EU funding.71 In its latest report on Mace-
donia, the Commission noted serious shortcomings in the electoral
process in Macedonia (related to the 2008 elections), the need to
strengthen "political dialogue" between the political parties, the
further need to ensure a public administration which is "transpar-
ent, professional and free of political interference," and the need
for "depoliticisation of senior police officers."72
The EU, on the other hand, quite understandably insists on
maintaining internal political stability in the country as a key re-
quirement for any future accession of Macedonia to the EU. In
fostering that goal, though, the EU often relies on established pat-
terns of autocratic inter-party politics in Macedonia, with party
leaders playing an all-important role. Like the rest of the interna-
tional actors active in the country, however, the EU should be
"aware that this is a risky game: the elites [it] support[s] are ob-
viously corrupted; they have not only heavily ethnicized but also
politicized the state institutions."73 This practice only fuels the
existing un-democratic practices in the country to the detriment of
the normal operation of its institutional system. Seen in that
69. See Ristovska-Jordanova, supra note 68. Monitoring of the fulfillment of the coun-
try's obligations under the SAA and the Accession Partnership is performed through the
structures established under the Stabilization and Association process (the SA Council, SA
Committee), including through the issuance of yearly country progress reports. Id. at 442.
See Progress Report on Macedonia (2008), infra note 70.
70. See Commission's 2008 Progress Report on Macedonia, ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY
AND MAIN CHALLENGES 2008-2009, 674 (2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press-corner/key-documents/reports nov_2008_en.htm
71. See id. See also The Union's Accession Partnership with Macedonia of 2008, supra
note 70, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press-corner/key-
documents/reports-nov_2008_en.htm
72. Id. at 8, 12-13.
73. Vankovska, supra note 50, at 15.
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light, the EU's efforts in steering Macedonia's political system to-
wards democratic standards often are counterproductive to its ac-
tivities that focus on maintaining Macedonia's political stability,
which commonly takes precedence promoting democratic devel-
opment and the rule of law.
V. CONCLUSION
The Republic of Macedonia's experience over the past few dec-
ades clearly demonstrates that, in a country where complex fac-
tors related to democratic transition and maintenance of stability
in a multi-ethnic setting are at play, the establishment of a func-
tional democratic system of governance according to the principle
of separation of powers is not an easy task. The separation of
powers cannot be achieved by mere legislation. Much effort is re-
quired to break down autocratic patterns of governance by closed
party leadership produced by the transition process, threatening
to dominate the operation of all state institutions and overall so-
cial life. This effort has to be carefully balanced with the activities
aimed at providing internal political stability in a country largely
divided on ethnic lines. Past developments in Macedonia have
shown that, if that balance is shifted towards maintaining stabil-
ity-which is dependant on local party leadership of different eth-
nicities-instead of respect for constitutional principles and law,
the development of a functional democratic system of governance
based on clear division of powers could be easily endangered. In
the long term, it seems that the key for providing both true de-
mocratic political governance and stability in the country lies in
the need for internal democratization of political parties and for
raising the level of political culture within and outside political
parties. The latter requires development of comprehensive educa-
tion programs aimed at promoting a sense for democratic account-
ability and for "civic public virtue" among party membership and
among wider citizenry, including inside the media and civil soci-
ety, neither of which are immune from partisan politics. In the
case of Macedonia, where democratic development largely depends
on active assistance by the EU, the EU institutions should care-
fully consider the need for internal democratization of political
parties and for societal education about democratic principles to
guide Macedonia through preparation for accession to the EU.
The EU should consider these same ideas when guiding any other
country towards accession where that country requires a strong
internal presence due to similar political entrenchment.
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